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Introduction
In a recent Nature article, Cohn et al. (2014, henceforth CFM) boldly claim that their results “sug-
gest that the prevailing business culture in the banking industry weakens and undermines the
honesty norm” (p. 1).
The main empirical finding of the CFM paper is that a group of bank employees that answered
a series of questions about their work subsequently reported higher proportion of wins in a coin
flipping task (58.2%) than a control group of bank employees (51.6%) that answered questions of a
similar form but focused on their leisure activities instead of banking. Because one can on average
correctly guess the outcome of only half of the flips, a higher rate of success reported by a group
indicates that some of its members cheated. From this result the authors infer that asking bankers
about their work makes their professional identity more salient, which leads them to cheat more.
That in turn is supposed to suggest that “prevailing business culture in the banking industry favors
dishonest behavior” (CFM, p. 3).
We do not want to question the reality of their empirical findings. However, in line with pre-
vious critiques of priming research (Stafford, 2014), we want to point out certain limitations
of the inferences which can be drawn from the empirical results: First, the observed dishon-
est behavior after the banking identity prime does not necessarily mean that there are social
norms encouraging dishonesty in the banking industry. Instead of norms, a negative stereotype
of bankers’ dishonesty might be responsible for the observed effect: other stereotypes were shown
to influence behavior—for example priming of the “hooligan” stereotype decreases performance
in a trivia quiz (Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg, 1998). Second, it is not even necessary that
the observed difference in cheating had been caused by the priming of the professional identity.
Either the other group could have been primed to cheat less, or other related concepts could have
been primed in the experimental condition together with the banking identity and caused more
cheating.
Our goal is to highlight the fact that the study of cultural norms on behavior using indirect
methods often precludes us from making strong conclusions, because alternative explanations are
plentiful and hard to rule out. We offer suggestions how future studies can build on the CFM
design and more reliably answer the question whether the social norm in banking really supports
dishonesty.
Dishonest Culture or Just a Label
The most general issue with the interpretation of the results in CFM is that even if the
primed banking identity really had caused more cheating, one would still not be able to
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conclude that the norms in the banking industry are respon-
sible. Non-banker participants in one of the authors’ surveys
believed “that bank employees would be the most dishonest
group” (CFM, p. 3). Because it is plausible that bankers them-
selves are well aware of this bad reputation, it is also feasible
that bankers did not behave accordingly to the norm intrinsic to
the banking culture itself, but accordingly to the societal expec-
tations for their behavior (Baay et al., 2014) when their identity
as bankers was made salient. Interestingly, in a similar study with
a prison population, two CFM authors recognize this possibility:
“a person’s identity can change if society treats him or her as a
criminal, leading to the adoption of behavioral propensities con-
sistent with the criminal label” (Cohn et al., unpublished, p. 1,
footnote 2).
Previous studies have shown that performance in cognitive
ability tasks could be lowered (Steele and Aronson, 1995; Spencer
et al., 1999) or increased (Shih et al., 1999) by priming of gender
or racial identity. These results from the “stereotype threat” liter-
ature are not interpreted as proofs of existence of social norms for
higher or lower cognitive abilities of women or Asians. Instead, it
is proposed that societal expectations are causing the observed
changes in the task performance. One possible explanation of the
effect is that when a stereotype that one is inferior in a given task
is primed, one is not motivated to perform well (Dijksterhuis and
van Knippenberg, 1998). Similarly, bankers might not be moti-
vated to engage in “costly” honest behavior, when they would
regardless be perceived as dishonest by others.
The bad reputation of bankers could have been caused by
extreme, publicized cases of fraud that had created a false infor-
mation cascade (Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Anderson et al., 2006;
Hoff and Pandey, 2006). However, the stereotype would lead
to the same observed increase of dishonest behavior even if no
dishonesty-supporting social norms existed in the banking indus-
try. Therefore, the main conclusion of CFM about the existence
of such norms is not fully warranted.
Alternative Causes of the Observed
Difference in Dishonesty
The main empirical result of CFM is that bankers answering
work-related questions cheated significantly more than those
answering questions about their free time. However, from the
look at the rates of cheating in additional CFM experiments
using the same design but different participants (see Figure 1),
it becomes clear that this finding could be interpreted in a com-
pletely opposite way: the questions about their leisure activities
caused bankers to cheat less. This interpretation is at least as plau-
sible as the one the authors chose. However, it could have been
masked by calling the group with questions about leisure activ-
ities a “control group.” This implies that it represents a neutral
baseline with which the effect of experimental manipulation can
be compared. But there are no truly neutral questions, as every-
thing could make some concept salient and thus influence the
subsequent behavior. This is why more than one “control group”
should be used and only when the expected difference between
experimental and control conditions is observed for all of them,
we can consider the causal effect of experimental manipulation
proven.
Both above mentioned arguments hold even if we assume
that the professional identity (and nothing else) was success-
fully primed in the experimental condition. Below, we argue that
although the authors made a decent attempt to verify whether
the bankers’ identity had been primed, the used manipulation
task could not completely rule out the possibility that some other
concepts had been primed as well and subsequently caused the
observed difference in cheating.
In the manipulation check task, bankers in the experimen-
tal condition completed word fragments with banking-related
words more often than participants in the control group.
However, this result means only that banking-related words
were more activated for the participants who had just finished
answering questions about banking. The activation of other
related concepts was not measured and therefore the possibil-
ity of alternative causes of the difference in cheating remains
open.
One possibility is that the difference was caused by priming of
the concept of money (Vohs et al., 2008). The observed stronger
agreement with a statement that status is determined by finan-
cial success is also in line with this possibility, as bankers with
more strongly activated concept of money could agree with it
more and also cheat more. However, the propensity to be primed
with money and/or the influence of this prime on a subsequent
behavior is likely to be a personal characteristic (Smeesters et al.,
2009; Furnham et al., 2014) and not a feature of the banking
culture.
The authors themselves discuss the possibility of the money
priming and claim it was ruled out in a control experiment, in
which students in an experimental group were asked to answer
hypothetical questions about work in the banking sector and their
rate of misreporting was not statistically different from the con-
trol condition. The authors claim that if the concept of money
was responsible for cheating, we would see the same difference
in cheating rates with bankers as well as with students: it would
not matter that the banking identity or stereotype are not self-
relevant enough for the students and therefore not primed in the
same way as for bankers (Shih et al., 2002). However, this experi-
ment was done with a much lower incentive ($5 vs. $20 for each
successful guess), which is known to increase overall cheating
(Mazar et al., 2008). In addition, students could perceive bankers
as an out-group, which may have led them to attempt to distance
themselves from it and its expected dishonest behavior and thus
lower the cheating (Gino et al., 2009). And in fact, students in
the control group really cheated more than did bankers in the
control condition (57.9 vs. 51.6% of flips reported as successful),
but they also cheated (although not significantly) more than stu-
dents in the experimental group (57.9 vs. 56.4%), which in any
case limits the comparability of the results of these two exper-
iments. Moreover, the underlying assumptions that questions
associated with work in a bank activate the concept of money in
the same way for bankers as for students is itself questionable and
unsupported.
The correct way of ruling out the alternative explanation
would be to prime bankers with money (e.g., with images of bills)
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FIGURE 1 | Dishonesty rates in different samples. Error bars indicate 95% CIs. Figure adapted from the CFM results.
without making their identity or work-associated social norms
salient (which can be tested with the same manipulation check
already used by the authors).
There is also a possibility that questions about work invoked
feeling of entitlement to financial reward. It is known that more
productive workers tend to cheat more (Gill et al., 2013) and
bankers, after answering questions about their work, could feel
they are good in a very stressful job and thus deserve a greater
reward. Other professionals may compare themselves with their
peers preferably on other dimensions, but for bankers, we would
expect the financial comparison is readily available. However, this
will only strengthen the tendency to cheat, as people act more
dishonestly when they are comparing themselves to those who
are better off (John et al., 2014). Nobody is able to assess whether
bankers really did feel financially worse off than their colleagues,
because while bankers were asked “How high is your salary in
comparison to that of other employees in the same firm?” (CFM,
Supplementary Information, p. 29), non-banking professionals
got the question with “the national average salary” as a reference
for a comparison.
In order to rule out this alternative explanation, the sense
of entitlement should be controlled, as it is possible that
bankers feel greater entitlement to financial reward than other
professionals.
One surprising finding in the CFM paper is that the estimate
of cheating behavior did not differ between the experimental and
control group. From previous research it is known that unethi-
cally behaving people expect others to behave the same (Abbink
and Herrmann, 2011), hence we would expect the estimate of
cheating to be higher in a group that cheats more, regardless
of what caused the increase in cheating. However, these esti-
mates were not obtained from the actual participants in the main
study, but from a separate sample of different bankers. They
were divided to the experimental or control condition and read
the same materials as the participants in the original study. But
instead of actually performing the coin flipping task, they were
only asked to estimate, with a financial incentive for a correct
guess, the number of wins the participants reported on average.
Interestingly, participants quite over-estimated the proportion
of winning flips in the control condition (57.1 vs. 51.6% in the
main study) (CFM, Supplementary Information, p. 13), which
suggests that the originally observed result could be anomalous
and the main experiment should be replicated with a new sample
of bankers.
Conclusions
With all the above mentioned issues taken together, it becomes
clear that there are several plausible alternative explanations for
the effect observed in CFM which were not ruled out. Therefore,
we believe that the strong conclusions of the CFM study are not
fully justified. Especially the claim that social norms in the bank-
ing industry encourage dishonesty lacks empirical support, as all
results are perfectly in line with the possibility that not norms,
but societal expectations are causing the difference in cheating.
Moreover, the observed difference could have been caused by
priming the control group with free time and/or by priming
some other concepts together with the professional identity in the
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experimental group. All of these alternative explanations may be
less sensational than the one chosen by the authors; however, one
should always resist the temptation to over-confidently interpret
the empirical data.
In any case, the main finding should be replicated with a dif-
ferent sample of bankers, in order to establish dependability of
the effect (Brandt et al., 2013)—regardless of its cause(s).
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